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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Dan Ray Nelson appeals from his conviction for sexual battery of a child.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Nelson with one count of lewd conduct with a child
under the age of 16 and one count of sexual battery on a child age 16 or 17. (R.,
pp. 32-33, 45-46.) The victim in both counts was C.F. (Id.)
The witnesses at trial included C.F. (Tr., p. 147, Ls. 17-20); Detective John
Marley (Tr., p. 292, Ls. 15-25); and the defendant, Nelson (Tr., p. 400, Ls. 1219). C.F. testified that for a period of over four years before he turned 18, Nelson
repeatedly had C.F. touch Nelson’s penis or Nelson manually or orally touched
C.F.’s penis. (Tr., p. 155, L. 24 – p. 156, L. 16; p. 162, L. 1 – p. 180, L. 10; p.
186, L. 15 – p. 214, L. 20.) Detective Marley testified he interviewed Nelson.
(Tr., p. 304, Ls. 3 – p. 304, L. 24.) Nelson initially claimed he had no sexual
contact with C.F., but later stated that on one occasion C.F. touched Nelson’s
genitals without Nelson’s consent, and that on another occasion he was assisting
then-17-year-old C.F. to trim his pubic hair when C.F. became erect and Nelson
put C.F.’s penis in his mouth. (Tr., p. 306, L. 12 – p. 324, L. 22.) Detective
Marley testified that he recorded the interview, but for unknown reasons only the
video recorded, and not the audio. (Tr., p. 327, L. 22 – p. 329, L. 16; State’s
Exhibit 1.)
Nelson testified at trial and denied telling Detective Marley that he had put
his mouth on C.F.’s penis. (Tr., p. 428, Ls. 4-20.) Nelson testified that Detective
1

Marley was lying about him admitting to having taken C.F.’s penis in his mouth
when he trimmed C.F.’s pubic hair. (Tr., p. 452, L. 1 – p. 456, L. 4.)
The prosecutor’s closing arguments included several themes, two of which
are relevant to this appeal: that an inconsistency in the victim’s prior statements
regarding the number of times he had been sexually touched by Nelson did not
show his testimony to be unreliable (Tr., p. 488, L. 19 – p. 490, L. 2), and that
Detective Marley did not fabricate Nelson’s confession to performing oral sex on
C.F. when trimming C.F.’s pubic hair (Tr., p. 492, L. 1 – p. 495, L. 11). Nelson
objected to neither of these arguments at trial. (Tr., p. 488, L. 19 – p. 490, L. 2;
p. 492, L. 1 – p. 495, L. 11.)
The jury returned verdicts of not guilty of lewd conduct but guilty of sexual
battery. (R., p. 103.) The district court imposed a sentence of 25 years with
three years determinate. (R., pp. 170-71.) Nelson filed a timely appeal. (R., pp.
188-91.)
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ISSUE
Nelson states the issue on appeal as:
Did the State violate Mr. Nelson’s constitutional right to a fair trial by
committing multiple acts of prosecutorial misconduct during closing
argument?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 9.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Nelson failed to identify any impropriety in the prosecutor’s final
argument, much less demonstrate fundamental error?
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ARGUMENT
Nelson Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor’s Final
Argument
A.

Introduction
For the first time on appeal, Nelson asserts the prosecutor made two

incorrect arguments in closing by “vouching for the credibility of the investigating
officer” and “appealing to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 10.) In neither instance has Nelson shown an improper
argument, much less misconduct rising to the level of fundamental error.
B.

Standard Of Review
The “standard of review governing claims of prosecutorial misconduct

depends on whether the defendant objected to the misconduct at trial.” State v.
Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 715, 215 P.3d 414, 435 (2009). If a defendant fails to
timely object at trial to allegedly improper closing arguments by the prosecutor,
the conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only upon a showing
by the defendant that the alleged misconduct rises to the level of fundamental
error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010). Claims of
fundamental error are reviewed using a three-part test:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant’s substantial rights, meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.
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Id. at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 (footnote omitted).
C.

Nelson Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Prosecutor’s
Arguments Regarding The Detective’s Credibility
Prosecutors have considerable latitude in closing argument and have the

right to discuss the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising from
therefrom. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003). The
purpose of the prosecutor’s closing argument is to enlighten the jury and help the
jurors remember and interpret the evidence. State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,
450, 816 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. App. 1991). In reviewing a claim of improper
argument by a prosecutor “‘a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor
intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury,
sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of
less damaging interpretations.’” State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 719, 215
P.3d 414, 439 (2009) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647
(1974)). Likewise, arguments should be evaluated in light of defense conduct
and the context of the entire trial. Id.
A prosecutor may "express an opinion in argument as to the truth or falsity
of testimony . . . when such an opinion is based upon the evidence." State v.
Timmons, 145 Idaho 279, 288, 178 P.3d 644, 653 (Ct. App. 2007); see also State
v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14, 909 P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1996) (While a prosecutor
may not “express a personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any
testimony or evidence,” a prosecutor may “express how, from [the prosecutor’s]
perspective, the evidence confirms or calls into doubt the credibility of particular
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witnesses.”). A prosecutor may also argue “that the state’s evidence and theory
of the case [is] more convincing.” State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20, 189 P.3d
477, 482 (Ct. App. 2008).

A prosecutor’s opinions and argument do not

constitute vouching unless the prosecutor interjects “personal belief” regarding
the evidence or a witness’s credibility, Timmons, 145 Idaho at 289, 178 P.3d at
654, or asks jurors “to make their decision based upon … the prosecutor’s selfproclaimed moral rectitude and integrity rather than addressing the evidence,”
Gross, 146 Idaho at 20, 189 P.3d at 482. Review of the record shows that,
rather than improper vouching, the prosecutor’s arguments were limited to the
evidence in the record.
In addressing Nelson’s claim that Detective Marley lied when he testified
that Nelson admitted putting C.F.’s penis in his mouth, the prosecutor argued that
either Detective Marley or Nelson had to be lying about what Nelson said in the
interview. (Tr., p. 493, Ls. 1-3.) The prosecutor then said he intended to walk
through the argument regarding who was lying, “a step at a time.” (Tr., p. 493,
Ls. 4-6.) The prosecutor’s steps included that Detective Marley testified that
Nelson, in the interview, had denied all other wrongdoing (arguing that a madeup confession would have been more extensive and detailed); that Nelson’s sole
confession to oral copulation came only after being confronted with the unlikely
nature of his initial statements about trimming pubic hair; that even when denying
wrongdoing Nelson’s statements often corroborated C.F.’s claims; and, finally,
that Nelson’s gestures in the video (making cutting motions) were consistent with
Detective Marley’s version but not Nelson’s version of what Nelson was saying at
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that moment. (Tr., p. 493, L. 12 – p. 495, L. 11.) The prosecutor concluded that
it was “ridiculous to suggest [Detective Marley’s] mistaken on that or he’s lying.”
(Tr., p. 495, Ls. 9-10.)
In the course of this argument, the prosecutor said two things that Nelson,
for the first time on appeal, finds objectionable. First, the prosecutor stated he
was trying to walk through the steps of the argument “very objectively, because
the absurdity to suggest that Detective Marley would lie about this makes my skin
crawl.” (Tr., p. 493, Ls. 6-8.) Second, arguing that if Detective Marley was going
to fabricate a confession he would have had Nelson confessing to everything, the
prosecutor argued that “I can do a better job” and “we can do a better job” of
making up a false confession than the true confession Detective Marley testified
to. (Tr., p. 494, L. 13 – p. 495, L. 1.) Application of the correct legal principles to
both of these arguments shows no error, much less fundamental error.
1.

The Prosecutor Properly Argued That The Claim Detective Marley
Fabricated Nelson’s Confession Was Absurd

The prosecutor’s statement that “the absurdity” of the claim that Detective
Marley lied about Nelson’s admission made his “skin crawl” was not vouching for
the detective. The “skin crawl” comment was aimed at the “absurdity” of claiming
the detective was lying, and was made in the context of an argument that the
evidence showed the claim the detective was lying was “ridiculous.” There is
nothing in the argument made by the prosecutor—that the “absurdity” of the
claim of lying made his “skin crawl”—suggesting it was based on anything other
than the evidence.
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Nelson argues that by stating that the “absurdity” of the lying claim made
his “skin crawl” the prosecutor was expressing personal belief as to the credibility
of the detective. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-13.) He does not articulate, however,
how the argument was based on anything other than the evidence. First, there is
nothing in the statement itself—“I’m trying to do this very objectively, because the
absurdity to suggest that Detective Marley would lie about this makes my skin
crawl” (Tr., p. 493, Ls. 5-8)—suggesting it was based on anything outside the
evidence presented. Moreover, the statement was made in the context of an
argument that the evidence (including evidence that Nelson made cutting
motions while making the statement he claimed was not a confession to cutting
C.F.’s pubic hair) made the claim “ridiculous.”

Neither the language of the

statement itself nor the context in which it was made support any prong of
Nelson’s claim of fundamental error.
2.

The Prosecutor Properly Argued That The Confession Was Not A
Lie Because A Fabricated Confession Would Have Been More
Incriminating

In the course of arguing one of the steps for determining if the Detective
was telling the truth or lying about Nelson’s confession, the prosecutor argued
that a lie would have been fabricated “better” because a fabricated confession
would have been more incriminating. (Tr., p. 494, L. 18 – p. 495, L. 1.) To
emphasize the point, the prosecutor stated that “I” and “we” “can do a better job”
of fabricating a false confession. (Tr., p. 494, Ls. 18-21.) This statement—that
“I” and “we” could make up better false confessions—was a proper argument for
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the jury to apply its common sense and experience in evaluating whether
Detective Marley’s testimony regarding Nelson’s confession was a lie or the truth.
On appeal Nelson challenges the prosecutor’s choice of pronouns,
arguing that use of the word “we” put the prosecutor and detective “on the same
team.” (Appellant’s brief, pp. 14-15.) First off, in context the “we” used by the
prosecutor is apparently a reference to the prosecutor and the jurors being able
to come up with a better lie than the detective allegedly did. The prosecutor said,
“I mean, if you want me to lie to you, we can do a better job” (Tr., p. 494, Ls. 1821 (emphasis added)), not “if you want us to lie to you, we can do a better job.”
The prosecutor’s use of the word “we” did not convert a perfectly proper
argument—that if the detective had fabricated a confession as claimed by Nelson
he would have fabricated one more helpful to the state—into error, much less
fundamental error.
D.

The Prosecutor’s Invitation To The Jury To “Imagine” Being In C.F.’s
Circumstances When He Was Interviewed By A Forensic Examiner In
Order To Evaluate His Credibility Was Not Improper Argument
Appeals to the emotions, passions or prejudices of the jury through use of

inflammatory tactics are impermissible. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758,
769, 864 P.2d 596, 607 (1993). One such tactic is to improperly request the
jurors to put themselves in the position of a party or victim. State v. Gross, 146
Idaho 15, 21, 189 P.3d 477, 483 (Ct. App. 2008) (improper to ask jurors to “step
into the shoes of a hypothetical victim of [defendant’s] alleged drunk driving”).
This type of improper argument is called a “golden rule” argument. Lopez v.
Langer, 114 Idaho 873, 878-79, 761 P.2d 1225, 1230-31 (1988).
9

However,

although a “golden rule” argument is improper when used to “encourage[] the jury
to depart from neutrality,” it is “appropriate when used to ask the jury to assess
the reasonableness of a party’s actions by relying on their own common sense
and life experiences.” Id. See also State v. Long, 975 A.2d 660, 675-77 (Conn.
2009) (argument to “look at” victim’s statements and actions “from the
perspective of that fourteen year girl” not improper (emphasis omitted)). Review
shows the prosecutor’s argument to “imagine” being an 18-year-old undergoing a
forensic sex interview, made in relation to the victim’s credibility, was a proper
argument based on the jury’s common sense and life experiences, and not a call
to sympathize with the victim.
During cross examination, Nelson’s counsel questioned C.F. extensively
about possible inconsistencies between his testimony and his statements to a
forensic sex abuse examiner. (Tr., p. 237, L. 10 – p. 238, L. 19; p. 250, L. 25 – p.
253, L. 7; p. 253, L. 24 – p. 255, L. 17; p. 258, Ls. 12-21; p. 260, L. 19 – p. 261,
L. 18; p. 261, L. 19 – p. 262, L. 10; p. 265, L. 8 – p. 266, L. 24.) In closing, the
prosecutor argued that the inconsistencies did not ultimately call C.F.’s testimony
into question. (Tr., p. 488, L. 19 – p. 490, L. 11.) As part of that argument the
prosecutor asked the jurors to “imagine going in” to the interview as an 18-yearold male and revealing to a woman interviewer “all of the sexual activity you did
with a 40-something-year-old.”

(Tr., p. 489, Ls. 12-21.)

By this thought

experiment the prosecutor was “suggesting” C.F., who was in those
circumstances, might “hold some things back” or “not acknowledge” some of the
sexual activities. (Tr., p. 489, L. 22 – p. 490, L. 2.)
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The prosecutor’s argument to “imagine” a person in the victim’s
circumstances undergoing a forensic sex abuse interview was a proper argument
to consider the victim’s credibility in light of his circumstances. Nelson’s claim
that it constituted fundamental error is without merit.1
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment for sexual
battery on a child age 16 or 17.
DATED this 19th day of January, 2016.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen____________
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

1

The jury acquitted on the lewd conduct charge and convicted only on the sexual
battery charge. (R., p. 103.) Because the evidence showed Nelson confessed to
the act underlying the lewd conduct charge (performing oral sex on C.F. when
trimming his pubic hair), it appears that the jury’s verdict could not have been
influenced by the prosecutor’s argument regarding whether the victim’s testimony
regarding other incidents of sexual contact was inconsistent with prior
statements. Nelson has therefore failed to establish prejudice regarding this
claim of fundamental error even if he could establish clear constitutional error.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of January, 2016, served a
true and correct digital copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by
emailing the brief to:
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